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THE PUBLIC SCHOOL AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH-STUDENT NEWSPAPERS
"The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market."' This concept, from an early case involving
freedom of speech, has recently been asserted in the federal courts by students
of public high schools and state supported universities and colleges. Litigation
by students against school authorities has increased rapidly within the last several years,2 and the occasional instances of censorship or suppression of student
expression have provided the courts with new problems in the application of
3
First Amendment rights.
The censorship of student publications, whether distributed under academic
auspices or without official sanction, presents a conflict between the traditional
legal attitudes toward school authority and the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. The law has historically exhibited great restraint and unwillingness to interfere when presented with a conflict involving school disciplinary action. This reluctance was expressed in an early case as follows:
.. . the maintenance of discipline, the upkeep of the necessary tone
and standards of behavior in a body of students in a college . . . is a
task committed to the faculty and officers, not to the courts. It is a task
which demands special experience, and is one of much delicacy . . 4
In addition to the lack of expertise of the courts in dealing with school disciplinary problems, as expressed above, other reasons for this judicial reluctance
have been given. (1) Courts have been influenced by what has been called a
"contract theory." 5 This theory assumes that when a student enters an educational institution, he impliedly promises to obey all rules and regulations and
thus contracts away any substantive constitutional rights he may later wish to
assert. (2) Attendance at a public educational institution has been considered
a privilege conditioned upon the waiver of constitutional rights. 6 (3) Finally,
educational institutions have been said to stand "in loco parentis." Thus, the
1 From Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
2

See Lawson, Courts and Campuses, The Wall Street Journal, November 25, 1969, at 1,

col. 1.
3 We do not concern ourselves here with the problem of teachers, non-students or the
students of private institutions engaged in the same activities on public school property.
While many of the same considerations would be applicable, the ultimate decision in cases
of this type would not depend upon factors relevant to public school students.
4 Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 551, 126 A. 882, 883 (1924).
5 This theory was described in an early case as follows:
Every student, upon his admission into an institution of learning, impliedly promises to submit to . . . all necessary and proper rules and regulations which have
been, or may thereafter be adopted for the government of the institution . . ..
State v. White, 82 Ind. 278, 286 (1882).
6 See North v. Board of Trustees, 37 ll. 296, 27 N.E. 54 (1891). The classic application
of this idea was in Anthony v. Syracuse University, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435
(1928), which upheld the dismissal of a female student for not being a "typical Syracuse
girL"
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school is deemed to occupy the place of the parent while the student is attending
classes, and the school authorities may then justifiably impose any rule or regulation with the same discretion as the parent. 7
So far as these concepts may have formerly justified school authorities in
arbitrarily denying freedom of speech to students, they seem to have been rendered ineffectual by a recent decision of the Supreme Court. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,s several high school students
had worn black armbands in school to protest the hostilities in Viet Nam and to
publicize their support for a truce. This action was taken several days after the
school board had adopted a rule forbidding the students from wearing armbands
in school. Violators were to be requested to remove them, and if they refused,
were to be suspended from school. The petitioning students were sent home and
forbidden from returning wearing the armbands. They sought an injunction to
restrain the school authorities from so punishing them. The District Court dismissed the complaint 9 after an evidentiary hearing and the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed without opinion. 10
The Supreme Court held that wearing the armbands as a method of protest
was "closely akin to 'pure speech'-"I and thus entitled to full protection under
the First Amendment. It held this protection applicable to the situation, saying:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
12
gate.
The court rejected the lower court finding that the school authorities had acted
reasonably because of a fear of a disturbance caused by the armbands. A fear or
apprehension of disruption is not sufficient to overcome the right to freedom of
expression, and the decision could not be upheld without a finding that:
. . the exercise of the forbidden right would 'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
,.1
the operation of the school .
-

The District Court had made no such finding and the decision was reversed.
In Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913), the court said:
College authorities stand "in loco parentis" concerning physical and moral welfare ... of the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that end, they may not make
any rule or regulation for the government or betterment of their pupils that a parent
could for the same purpose. Whether the rules or regulations are wise or their aims
worthy is a matter left solely to the discretion of the authorities or parents, as the
case may be, and, in the exercise of that discretion, the courts are not disposed to
interfere. ...
8 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
9 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
10 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
11 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
12 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Is 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
7
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The standard expressed in Tinker was expressly adopted from Burnside v.
Byars,14 an earlier decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
made on similar facts. 15 Although the Supreme Court has held in other controversies that denial of freedom of expression requires an "imminent danger of
disruption,"'16 this standard was not used in deciding either Tinker or Burnside.
It appears, however, that the result reached was the same as if the same test had
been utilized. In Tinker the court emphasized that merely a fear or apprehension
1T
of disruption would not be sufficient to justify the denial of free expression,
but that a determination that the expression would materially disrupt the operation of the school was necessary. This determination would require some foreseeability of disruption amounting to more than a fear or apprehension, and the
requirement would seem to reach substantially, if not exactly, the same result
as the "imminent danger" test. Thus, even though the test was not expressed as
in previous non-school-related First Amendment cases, an imminent danger of
substantial disruption seems to be almost a requirement to denial of student expression.
The Tinker case has thus far been applied by the courts to cases involving
student expression with varying results. In Zucker v. Panitz,i8 the right of students to buy an advertisement in their school newspaper expressing their opposition to the war in Viet Nam was held protected. The court refused to justify the
school officials' action of censoring the advertisement and held that a commitment
by the administrators to publish the paper also imposed an obligation to respect
the students' freedom of expression. The case interpreted Tinker broadly enough
to extend beyond black armbands to reach and protect expression in officially
sanctioned school newspapers. 19
An underground newspaper distributed on campus which berated the student-body for apathy and urged them to "stand up and fight" the school admin14

363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).

15 The students in Burnside wore buttons on school premises which bore the words "One

Man-One Vote" and "SNCC" (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee). They were
suspended and the Court of Appeals refused to uphold the action of the school authorities.
For a discussion of Burnside, see Nahmod, Black Arm Bands and Underground Newspapers:
Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools, 51 Chicago Bar Record 144 (1969).
16 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563 (1969) ; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg the court said:
...
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of [disruption] except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent [disruption] and is likely to incite or produce

such [disruption].

395 U.S. 444, 447.
17 The court said:
..in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression ....
our Constitution says we must
take this risk ....

393 U.S. 503, 508.
18 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
19 The court in Zucher also relied on an earlier case, Dickey v. Alabama State Board
of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), which held that a university could not

interfere with legitimate criticism of state officials in a sanctioned school newspaper.
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istration by seizing campus buildings was held not protected in Norton v. East
Tennessee State University DisciplinaryCommittee.20 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a District Court decision which held the suspension
of the offending students justifiable. The court noted that the language used in
the literature was "an open exhortation to the students to engage in disorderly
and destructive activity" 21 and that, in view of the inflammatory nature and disruptive characteristics of the student expression, the school authorities could reasonably forecast, as required by Tinker, that it would cause disturbances and
disorder. The court said:
It is not required that the college authorities delay action against
the inciters until after the
riot has started and the buildings have been
22
taken over and damaged.
However, the court did not examine the specific circumstances surrounding the
words to determine if there was any reasonable basis, outside of the expression
itself, for the forecast of disruption. Mr. Justice Celebrezze vigorously dissented
because of this omission. He said:
The pamphlets were not distributed in any angry crowd or in the wake
of prior disturbances, but on campus of presumably tempered and rational students, and should therefore
be read as merely "advocating,"
23
not "inciting," unlawful activities.
It is submitted that in rejecting mere fear of disruption and requiring a finding that a reasonable forecast of disruption be made, the Supreme Court in Tinker precluded censorship based solely upon the words used. The determination
that a disturbance will result would seem to require a weighing of the circumstances surrounding the expression, and thus, in Norton, the court's omission resulted in a proscription of speech in a manner inconsistent with Tinker.
This conclusion is supported by a recent Seventh Circuit opinion, Scoville v.
Board of Education of Joliet Township High School District 204.24 In that case
several high school students were disciplined for circulating an underground
newspaper which, in several articles, criticized school officials and their policies.
The literature said that the Senior Dean of the school had a "sick mind" and
urged the students to refuse to accept or destroy any notices distributed to them
by the school in the future. Prior to the Tinker decision and on appeal from an
order granting a motion to dismiss, the court held that the words used were inherently disruptive as a matter of law and thus refused to allow an evidentiary
hearing to determine the imminence of possible disruption presented by the
words. After the Tinker decision was rendered, the court granted a rehearing en
20 38 U.S.L.W. 2317 (6th Cir., November 28, 1969).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 2318.
23
24

Id.

286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Il.), af'd 415 F.2d 860, reversed on rehearing, No. 17190
(7th Cir., April 1, 1970).
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banc and reversed. It held that Tinker requires some inquiry into the facts surrounding student expression to justify denial of free speech and that the result
of that inquiry must support a reasonable forecast that the words "would substantially disrupt or materially interfere with school procedures." The court said:
We conclude that absent an evidentiary showing, and an appropriate
balancing of the evidence by the district court to determine whether
the Board was justified in a 'forecast' of the disruption and interference, as required under Tinker, plaintiffs are entitled
to the declaratory
25
judgment, injunctive and damage relief sought.
Thus the interpretation given the Tinker case in Scoville is substantially at variance with that given it in Norton v. East Tennessee State University Disciplinary
26
Committee.
Student newspapers distributed on the campus of a public educational institution represent expression that can perform a valuable service to the learning
process of students as well as to society as a whole. In 1966, a group of educators
met in Washington, D.C., under the auspices of the American Association of
University Professors and drafted a joint statement on the rights and freedoms
of students for recommended adoption by school authorities. Article IV, Section
D, pertaining to student publications reads, in part, as follows:
Student publications and the student press are a valuable aid in establishing and maintaining an atmosphere of free and responsible discussion and of intellectual exploration on the campus. They are a means
of bringing the students' concerns to the attention of the faculty and
the institutional authorities and of formulating student opinion on
27
various issues on the campus and in the world at large.
The preservation of the value of free expression of opinion in public schools is
dependent upon judicial action which accurately balances the harm resulting
from the denial of free speech against the gravity and imminence of the disruption of school activity. The inconsistent manner of application of the Tinker decision indicates the existence of a hesitance to afford students full freedom of expression within the confines of constitutional standards as set out by the Supreme
Court. Because of this, students, who have recently become so adept at asserting
their rights within the accepted channels of adult society, will probably continue
to strive for a less confining standard and more liberal construction of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.
CHARLES H. LEVAD
25
26

Id.

38 U.S.LW. 2317 (6th Cir., November 28, 1969).
As reproduced in Working Papers, XXII Congress, United States National Students'
Association (1969).
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